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FOURTH CIRCUIT SUMMARY
The Fourth Circuit Summary, published at least once a year, provides a
synopsis of important recent environmental decisions decided by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The summary does not cover
every environmental decision of the Fourth Circuit, but only those cases that
the editors believe to be of most interest to subscribers. The cases discussed
below were decided in 2002 and 2003.
Hodges v. Abraham, 300 F.3d 432 (4th Cir. 2002)
In an opinion by Circuit Judge King (to which Judge Widener and
Judge Niemeyer joined), the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision of the
United States District Court for the District of South Carolina with respect to
the plaintiffs standing to maintain this action and whether the Department
of Energy and its Secretary, Spencer Abraham ("DOE") failed to comply with
the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") in transferring surplus
plutonium from Colorado to South Carolina.
In 1995, the DOE began looking for sites to store surplus plutonium.
On April 19, 2002, the DOE announced that six metric tons of surplus
plutonium would be transferred to the Savannah River Site ("SRS") in South
Carolina. The case discusses NEPA's requirements placed upon the DOE
that certain procedures be followed. On May 1, 2002, Governor Hodges
brought a complaint against the DOE concerning the transfer of the surplus
plutonium in the District of South Carolina. Governor Hodges sought a
declaratory judgment that the DOE failed to adhere to NEPA and an
injunction prohibiting the DOE from transferring surplus plutonium from
Colorado to SRS. The district court granted the DOE's motion for summary
judgment and declined to enjoin the transfer of the plutonium to SRS.
The Fourth Circuit denied Governor Hodges' request for an injunction
pending appeal, but expedited the proceeding. Governor Hodges asserted
that the DOE did not comply with NEPA before issuing its April Record of
Decision and sought an injunction prohibiting the DOE from transferring any
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surplus plutonium to SRS until the DOE fully complied with all applicable
laws. The DOE responded that Governor Hodges lacked the standing to
initiate and pursue this case, and that it had complied with NEPA.
In resolving an issue of jurisdiction, the court rejected the DOE
assertion that the lawsuit of Governor Hodges was a parens patriae action
lacking the necessary standing and held that he, in his official capacity, had
a concrete interest that NEPA was made to protect.
Finally, the court held that because the DOE complied with the NEPA
requirements, and the decision to transfer the surplus plutonium was not
arbitrary and capricious, to affirm the district court's award or summary
judgment to the DOE.
Franks v. Ross, 313 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 2002)
In an opinion by Circuit Judge King (to which Judge Motz and Senior
Judge Beezer, the Senior Circuit Judge of thee United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit sitting by designation, joined), the Fourth
Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the decision of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina
respecting the dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint.
Plaintiffs alleged racial discrimination in the siting process for
construction of landfills and argued for injunctive relief against Wake County
and officials from the North Carolina Department of Environmental and
Natural Resources ("DENR"). The complaint asserted that the actions of the
defendants violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VIII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S. C. § 1982, and the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs also asserted a public policy
challenge against the Wake County defendants, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 14-234 ("State Claim").
The district court dismissed the Title VI, § 1982, and Equal Protection
claims against Wake County on the grounds of untimeliness. The district
court also dismissed the State Claim and the Title VIII claim for failure to
state claims upon which relief could be granted. The district court also
dismissed the plaintiffs' claims against the DENR defendants relying on
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. Finally, the district court, in




The plaintiffs asserted in their appeal that the district court abused its
discretion in refusing to grant leave to amend, improperly dismissed their
claims against Wake County, and incorrectly granted immunity to the DENR
defendants. The Fourth Circuit addressed the refusal to grant leave to amend
by the district court as a conclusion based on an error of material fact. This
is because the plaintiffs waited less than three months to amend their
complaint, contrary to the district court's understanding of the plaintiffs
waiting seven months to amend their complaint. This district court believed
that the Superior Court issued its Permit Reissuance Decision on October 4,
2000, and that the plaintiffs had not sought leave to amend until April 27,
2001. However, the Superior Court had issued its Permit Reissuance
Decision on March 16, 2001, and the Plaintiffs had filed their motion to
amend on May 29, 2001. The court also addressed the dismissal of the
claims against Wake County by holding that the federal claims were timely
because issuance of a permit, not siting of the landfills constituted final
agency action; however, the district court did not err in dismissing the State
Claim. Finally, the court addressed the plaintiffs' claims that the DENR
defendants were entitled to immunity by holding that the plaintiffs adequately
asserted claims for injunctive relief against the DENR under Exparte Young.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the State Claim against
Wake County but reversed the dismissal of the Title VI, § 1982, and Equal
Protection claims against Wake County. The court also reversed the district
court concerning its refusal to authorize an amendment of the complaint and
finding the DENR defendants were entitled to immunity. Finally, the court
remanded for further proceedings as appropriate.
Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp. v. United States EPA,
313 F.3d 852 (4th Cir. 2002)
In an opinion by Circuit Judge Widener (in which Judge Motz and
Howard joined), the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction the decision of the United
States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina respecting the
ability to review an EPA report as reviewable agency action under the APA.
The EPA presented five arguments on appeal challenging the district
court's finding that the EPA had violated its statutory obligations under the
Radon Gas and Indoor Air Quality Research Act ("Radon Act"). First, the
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EPA argued that the district court incorrectly held that the 1993 report that
classified secondhand smoke as a known human carcinogen was reviewable
final agency action under the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704. Next, the EPA
asserted that the district court erroneously found that the plaintiffs had
standing to challenge the EPA's report. Then, the EPA argued that it
complied with section 403(c) of the Radon Act by appointing an industry
representative to serve on an advisory group during the EPA's research
program about secondhand smoke. Fourth, the EPA argued that even if it
violated the Radon Act by not properly establishing an advisory committee,
that the error was harmless and not grounds for vacating the EPA's report.
Finally, the EPA asserted that the district court exceeded the scope ofjudicial
review of the agency.
The Fourth Circuit held that the report was not reviewable agency
action under the APA and ordered that the judgment of the district court be
vacated and remanded for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 317 F.3d 425
(4th Cir. 2003)
In an opinion by Judge Niemeyer (joined by Judge Hamilton), the
Fourth Circuit reversed the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia's declaratory judgment; vacated its injunction,
memorandums, and orders of May 8 and June 17, 2002; and remanded for
further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion. Also, Judge Luttig
wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Plaintiff brought action for declaratory and injunctive relief to declare
illegal the Corps of Engineers' interpretation of the Clean Water Act
("CWA") and to require the Corps to revoke a permit, issued to Martin
County Coal Corporation under § 404 of the CWA, authorizing Martin Coal
to place excess overburden into valley fills.
The district court held that "fill material" as used in § 404 only
referred to "material deposited for some beneficial purpose," not for waste
disposal, and consequently that the Corps' approval of waste disposal as fill
material under § 404 was ultra vires and extended past the Corps' authority.
The district court entered a prospective permanent injunction against the
Corps on the basis of its conclusion that whenever the Corps issues permits
for valley fills with no beneficial primary purpose it acts ultra vires.
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The Fourth Circuit held that the injunction prohibiting the Corps
district office from issuing any further permits approving valley fills for
waste disposal was overbroad; the declaration and injunction were vacated
due to reaching beyond the issues presented to the district court for
resolution; the Corps permissibly interpreted the CWA as authorizing them
to issue permits for the creation of valley fills in connection with coal mining
activities, even when the valley fills serve no purpose other than to dispose
of excess overburden from the mining activity; the Corps' 1977 regulation
defining "fill 'material" was a permissible reading of the CWA, and the
Corps' interpretation of its own regulation was not erroneous; and the Corps'
issuance of the permit in this case was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise contrary to law to such an extent as the plaintiffs
argued in the complaint.
Judge Luttig argued that the district court's entire injunction and
opinions should be vacated and the case remanded for consideration of the
sole issue of the lawfulness of the Martin Coal permit under the Corps' 1977
regulations.
United States v. Newsome, 322 F.3d 328 (4th Cir. 2003)
In an opinion by Judge Niemeyer (to which Chief Judge Wilkins and
Judge King joined), the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision of the United
States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia respecting the
defendants' challenges to their convictions and the amount of loss used in
sentencing and for calculating restitution.
The district court found that four of the initial seven defendants were
guilty of conspiracy to cut down and convert black cherry trees from the
Mononghahela National Forest. They also found three of the defendants
guilty on various substantive counts of theft. The district court held all four
defendants jointly and severally liable for the amount of $248,459.53, based
on the market value of the 95 trees that were cut down and stolen. Using the
amount of loss, the district court sentenced Ernest Brant and Denzil Grant to
46 months' imprisonment Taking into account the limited period of
involvement for Dallas Newsome, the district court sentenced him to 15
months' imprisonment. Michael Newsome was sentenced as a misdemeanant
and imposed a sentence of four months' home confinement.
2003]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
The defendants asserted in their appeal that the district court erred in
determining the amount of loss, for both the purpose of applying the
sentencing guidelines and ordering restitution. The Fourth Circuit upheld the
decision of the district court concerning the amount of loss for both
sentencing and restitution purposes. Grant, Brant, and Michael Newsome
argued that the district court improperly denied their motions for acquittal and
the evidence was not sufficient to convict them of theft or conspiracy to
commit theft. The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument, and found that the
jury had sufficient evidence. Dallas Newsome argued that the district court
erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence and that the judge
demonstrated bias toward him. Also the Fourth Circuit found Dallas
Newsome's argument to be without merit. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the
judgment of the district court.
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